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Abstract: In recent years there have been a number of high-profile plant closures in 
the UK. . In several cases, the policy response has included setting up a task force to 
deal with the impacts of the closure. It can be hypothesised a that task force involving 
multi-level working across territorial boundaries and tiers of government is crucial to 
devising a policy response tailored to people’s needs and to ensuring success in 
dealing with the immediate impacts of a closure. This suggests that leadership, and 
vision, partnership working and community engagement, and delivery of high quality 
services are important. This paper looks at the case of the MG Rover closure in 2005, 
to examine the extent to which the policy response to the closure at the national, 
regional and local levels dealt effectively with the immediate impacts of the closure, 
and the lessons that can be learned from the experience. Such lessons are of particular 
relevance given the closure of the LDV van plant in Birmingham in 2009 and more 
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broadly – such as in the case of the downsizing of the Opel operation in Europe 
following its takeover by Magna. 
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1. Introduction 
MG Rover closed in 2005 with the loss of 6,300 jobs. More jobs were lost in the 
supply chain. At first it was thought that as many as 12,000 jobs would be at risk but 
in the event the loss, estimated at 8,500 jobs, was less than initially expected (Bailey 
and Kobayashi, 2008). The UK government stepped in to deal with the closure and 
the MG Rover Task Force was set up to formulate the policy response. Task forces 
are not new; they have been common in the UK and elsewhere in bringing together 
multiple agencies to come up with solutions to tackle particular issues. Research on 
the nature and workings of task forces, especially on a comparative international basis 
is, however, limited. 
The aim of this paper is to assess the MG Rover Task Force to explore the 
extent to which the Task Force displayed effective governance and was able to secure 
multi-level working, across territorial boundaries and tiers of government, and to 
devise a policy response tailored to people’s needs in dealing with the immediate 
impacts of the closure [endnote 1]. Given contemporary debates in Britain over 
devolved responsibilities, a critical assessment on the ground is naturally important. 
Moreover, it can serve as one point of reference for future comparative research, 
drawing in the approaches and experience of other countries, in the EU and elsewhere 
in dealing with auto plant closures. These are significant economic events and are 
likely to continue given the over-capacity and restructuring taking place in the 
industry.  
 The paper is set out as follows. First it looks at the characteristics of a task 
force, and reviews the debate on devolved forms of governance, in order to establish 
criteria for the assessment of task forces. It next reviews the development of the MG 
Rover Task Force in 2005. This was the second task force to be set up to deal with 
employment issues at Rover, and the paper also looks at the work of the first Rover 
Task Force set up in 2000, when BMW divested itself of Rover. The paper then turns 
to an assessment of the MG Rover (MGR) Task Force.  
It finds that the MGR Task Force displays characteristics of effective 
governance and it speedily yielded an extensive range of policies to support to those 
made redundant. However, as our research on the closure of MG Rover shows, while 
most workers took up the support offered, few ex-workers actually felt adequately 
supported by government or the local community (Bailey, Chapain, Mahdon and 
Fauth, 2008). This suggests that while the Task Force was successful in enabling a 
policy response to be developed, it was less successful in terms of gaining legitimacy 
for the actions taken as a result of its deliberations. 
The paper concludes by suggesting that a key lesson is the need for policy 
responses to redundancy situations to be more responsive and that there is a need to 
gain legitimacy by communicating better with those being made redundant. This can 
help in both softening the blow of job loss and offer the hope that there has been a real 
attempt to develop a responsive policy to deal with the situation. Further research (and 
on a comparative basis) on the role of task forces in arriving at a policy response to 
auto industry closures is required and is especially relevant in the current economic 
crisis in 2009 when there are increasing redundancies. 
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2. Characteristics of a Task Force 
2.1 Task Forces are not new 
There is some debate in the literature about the characteristics of a task force. There is 
clearly a military connotation to the term ‘task force’; they emphasise the need for a 
rapid response to a crisis situation, of which there are a number of examples at 
national and international levels which have been set up to deal with natural and man 
made disasters. Task forces have however been more commonly set up to work on a 
single defined task or activity in a time limited way (i.e. a ‘task and finish’ group). 
These can be seen in the US in business practice but more particularly in the area of 
public policy. There is however a very limited literature on their use in the US, or in 
Europe; still less on their workings, which begs further and comparative research.  
In the UK, however, task forces have been extensively used in a public policy 
context and especially in addressing problems of economic decline in urban areas. 
The UK may well be unique in such a reliance on the task force model. For Barker et 
al (1999: 11) they “investigate and recommend new policies and practices or… 
…practical means of implementing policies”. While definitional debate can be had 
they are, as Pike (2002: 723) points out, “different from routine and consultation 
exercises that are standard Civil Service work such as Royal Commissions, 
Departmental Committees of Inquiry, Standing Expert Advisory Committees and 
Standing Statutory Advisory Boards.”  
2.2 Task Force as Governance 
Pike (2001, 2002, 2005) has undertaken the most extensive review of British task 
forces, as well as studies of closure of firms. He found that no less than 295 task 
forces had been set up at the national level in the UK between 1997 and 1999, to 
address a multitude of policy design and implementation questions. Pike (2002) offers 
a typology of the aims of task forces and categorises them by their focus on employers, 
sectors and/or territories (see Table 1). 
 
[table 1 goes here] 
 
Employer-based task forces are focused on particular employers in the locality and 
among other issues seek to address redundancy situations. The MG Rover Task Force 
falls into this category. Sectoral task forces also cover redundancy issues but in 
relation to sectors rather than individual companies, and undertake the analysis of 
trends in a sector, with the aim of improving competitiveness. Area based task forces, 
on the other hand, are in his view concerned with strategic issues in the regeneration 
and economic development of a locality. Local, regional and national level authorities 
in the UK have taken the lead in setting up the task forces and include local councils, 
Regional Development Agencies, and government departments [endnote 2].  
It is clear that task forces generally involve leadership provided by the state in 
policy formulation and implementation but with the participation of a number of 
actors both from inside and outside the state. They can be said to reflect the shift in 
reference in discourses from government to governance, defined as:  
 
“the complex art of steering multiple agencies, institutions and systems 
which are both operationally autonomous from one another and 
structurally coupled through various forms of reciprocal 
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interdependence…. Such ‘quasi-government’ has been functional to states 
to incorporate independent specialised expertise and to devolve 
responsibility but has raised concerns about co-ordination, transparency 
and accountability… “ 
(Jessop, 1997: 575) 
2.3 The State Modernisation Debate 
Why have task forces emerged? Pike (2002) provides an answer in situating the 
emergence of the task force approach within the state modernisation debate (see also 
Jones et. al., 2005). This suggests that new state forms are evolving under changing 
conditions for capital accumulation. It can be argued that three factors are driving 
these changes: globalisation; the dominant neo-liberal ideology; and the lack of faith 
in existing political institutions.   
Firstly, one can point to globalisation, where national control is thought to be 
no longer possible, given capital is both internationalising and regionalising, and 
which is leading to the (alleged) hollowing out of the nation state (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1995). This approach points to both the establishment of supranational 
institutions (such as the European Union and Mercosur in South America) as well as 
sub-national regional institutions, both to regulate economic development. This is 
giving rise to a pattern of multi-level governance, with institutions interacting and 
operating at different spatial scales (Hooghe and Marks, 2003).  
Second, Pike points to a dominant neo-liberal ideology in the western world, 
which promulgates a programme of deregulation, liberalisation, low taxation, and 
monetary controls, which in turn brings changes in the form and functions of the state 
in free market economies. In this vein, the so called ‘Third Way’ political economic 
project of the Labour Government since 1997 in the UK, which suggests there is a 
path between market mechanisms and the state, ‘provides a guiding theoretical shell 
for state modernisation’ (Pike, 2002; Giddens, 1998). Indeed, it has been argued that 
while the British state under Labour is centrist, it is a ‘new centralism’ in which 
government has been seen to decentralise and devolve power to the regions, and to the 
local level. An economic development function was passed to the Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) set up in England in 1999 and power devolved to 
Scotland via the Scottish Parliament and Wales, through the Welsh Assembly, both 
also established in 1999.  Nonetheless, this ‘new centralism’ is a ‘steering centralism’, 
where “the state controls through plans, targets, default powers and financial controls” 
(Corry and Stoker, 2002). In the language of Jessop (2004), there may be a situation 
of meta-governance, where governance operates ‘in the shadow of hierarchy’. 
As a third point, it is possible to point to a lack of faith in existing political 
institutions on the part of the electorate, which is leading to the establishment of new 
forms of the state to empower people. In the UK, ‘partnership working’ has almost 
become the norm, in particular in economic development and regeneration. For the 
Labour Government in the UK, in particular, the emphasis has been on including 
interest groups (‘stakeholders’) in the policy making process and to achieve ‘joined-
up’ approaches in dealing with ‘cross-cutting’ issues (Mawson, 1999; Bennett and 
Payne, 2000). In essence, however, there has been a search for institutional forms to 
reflect the need to secure community engagement, so as to gain legitimacy for 
government and public policy interventions. This focuses attention on the 
transformational aspect of partnership working, which stresses the benefit of coming 
together and learning from each other the limits of action but it also questions the 
degree of inclusivity (Mackintosh, 1992). The emergence of task forces generally and 
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the MG Rover Task Force in particular can be seen in the light of these developments. 
We turn to look at the constitution of the two Rover Task Forces before undertaking 
the assessment of the MG Rover Task Force. 
  
3. The Rover Task Force 
Two task forces have been set up in the West Midlands region in the UK to deal with 
closures and redundancies at Rover, the Rover Task Force mark 1 (RTF1), and the 
MG Rover Task Force mark 2 (RTF2). The paper focuses on the second but first, 
however, we look at RFT1 before turning our attention to the second task force. 
3.1 Rover Task Force Mark 1 
The first Rover Task Force was set up in 2000 by Stephen Byers, who was then 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, at the time when BMW divested itself of 
most of Rover, and split the company up (Bentley, 2000). This involved the 
rationalisation of production and its relocation in the different Rover plants located in 
different parts of the UK. BMW retained the Oxford plant to produce the new Mini, 
which was originally based at Longbridge, in Birmingham in the West Midlands. 
Production of the Rover 75 model, then based at Oxford, was shifted from Oxford to 
Longbridge. Longbridge was then sold to a local consortium, the Phoenix Group, for a 
nominal £10 (Bailey, 2003). Land Rover was sold to Ford for £1.8 billion, along with 
Rover’s design facility.  
The Task Force, clearly in Pike’s terms an employer based task force, led by 
the RDA, Advantage West Midlands (AWM) with the support of the Government 
Office of the West Midlands (GOWM), and the Chamber of Commerce, pressed for a 
credible package to support and develop the regional economy. This was focused on 
inter-linked themes of Modernisation (with funding of £17 million), Diversification 
(£19.7 million) and Regeneration (£22 million) (RTF, 2000). This is a slightly 
different focus from RTF2. Nonetheless, each has dealt with a crisis and possible 
closure of an auto industry employer. 
The modernisation programme included a number of linked initiatives to 
improve the competitiveness (in this case productivity) of the cluster. Among these 
was the Accelerate programme, managed by a Team at the Chamber of Commerce, 
which was funded to create supplier networks to contribute to improving activities in 
firms [endnote 3]. The diversification programme aimed to help suppliers diversify 
away from Rover and to encourage the application of engineering skills in other 
industries such as medical and nano technologies. RTF 1 assisted with development 
costs, with the Small Business Service providing a diversification service. The 
regeneration programme as will be seen below was concerned with the development 
of the site. 
Behind all this however was basically the cluster approach to economic 
development, being taken by the RDA and which had evolved over time since the 
RDA’s initial Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) which in turn was the starting point 
in developing the West Midlands Economic Strategy (WMES).  The RDA was able to 
use the RTF1 to accelerate and legitimise the emerging cluster policy and to extend it 
further. Indeed, the RTF1 was an attempt to link cluster policies with spatial targeting 
via corridors of regeneration, given continued concern over Rover’s prospects. The 
RTF1 Final Report identified three areas for an in-depth study of their growth 
potential as ‘high-tech corridors’. Of relevance here is the development of a ‘Central 
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Technology Belt’ (CTB) which was to tie in the University of Birmingham and its 
teaching hospital, to utilise part of the site of the (down-scaled) Rover Longbridge 
plant, to establish a new ‘medipark’, to develop a medical technology cluster (RTF, 
2000). The situation in 2005 was rather different; the company had actually closed 
and the new task force had to pick up the pieces. 
 
3.2 MG Rover Task Force (RTF2) 
The background to the closure of MG Rover is well documented (Coffey, 2009; 
Bailey, Kobayashi and MacNeill, 2008; Bentley, 2007; HOC 2007; NAO, 2006; 
Holweg and Oliver, 2005). Almost as soon as the announcement was made in April 
2005 that MG Rover was going into administration, AWM and the national 
government moved quickly to set up a new Rover Task Force (MG RTF2). In fact, 
there was a nascent RTF – a Joint Planning Group – set up by the DTI (Department of 
Trade and Industry) – that had been working discreetly in the background on a 
contingency plan to deal with the effects of a closure, as far back as December 2004 
(HOC, 2007). The terms of reference of the task force were firstly, to advise the 
Secretary of State on the following:  
 
 The implementation of the emergency package of support for MG Rover suppliers, 
the Longbridge workforce and the local community;  
 Other national and regional actions as appropriate to address the outcomes of the 
closure of MG Rover.  
 
Secondly, to advise Advantage West Midlands on: 
  
 The progress of regional and local partners in delivering the whole of the 
emergency package;  
 Changes to the West Midlands Regional Economic Strategy and implementation 
plan in the light of the closure of MG Rover.  
 
An aid package eventually worth £176 million was made available firstly, to help 
suppliers to keep going and to diversify; secondly, to aid workers in finding new jobs; 
and thirdly, to support the broader community. The MG Rover Task Force was 
involved in the development of policy to address the situation. The question is to what 
extent was it successful? We next turn to assess the effectiveness of the MG Rover 
Task Force. 
 
4. Assessment of the MG Rover Task Force 
4.1 Methodology: Exploring the Requirements for Effective Governance 
In order to answer the question to what extent did the MG Rover Task Force display 
effective governance, we assess the workings of the Task Force by considering the 
dimensions of governance required for effective task force performance. As the 
literature suggests, task forces involve multi-level working across territorial 
boundaries and tiers of government and vision, leadership, collaboration and 
community engagement (Jessop, 1997; Pike, 2002). While being given devolved 
responsibility to carry out the tasks, the ‘new centrist thesis’ suggests that this is likely 
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to be mediated by national policy, funding regimes and the remits of the participating 
agencies. We can also expect that a task force would produce tailored policy 
outcomes that better meet people’s needs and that high quality services would be 
delivered. Lastly, their legitimacy needs to be apparent if they are to have a role in 
relation to crisis management. We assess the workings of the MG Rover Task Force 
from these perspectives. 
 
4.1.1 Empirical Work 
Our empirical work was carried out as of a research project undertaken over the 
period 2008-2009, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) in 
the UK, to look at the impact of the closure of MG Rover and the policy response, 
three years on from the closure. It included: 
 
 A review of documents, reports and papers on the closure of MG Rover and the 
public policy response to the closure; 
 A questionnaire survey of a representative sample of 204 ex MG Rover workers;  
 Detailed face-to-face and telephone interviews with 30 ex MG Rover workers; 
 In depth face-to face interviews with members of the Rover Task Force, national 
and local policy-makers and policy delivery agencies; 
 In depth face-to-face interviews with community activists, and trade union 
officials. 
 
We turn to explore the characteristics of the Task Force in terms of: the extent of 
multi-level working; the degree of devolved responsibility; the policy responses 
devised as a result of its deliberations, and the extent of the received legitimacy of the 
outcomes of the actions of the Task Force.  
4.2 Multi-Level Working? 
Looking at the constitution of the Task Force, it is clear that there was multi-level and 
multi-agency working. Members were from a spread of territories, tiers of government 
and other agencies and included:  
 
 The national level (The DTI and local Members of Parliament (MPs));  
 The regional level (such as the RDA);  
 Local Authorities (among these, Birmingham City Council);  
 Skills Agencies (such as the Learning and Skills Council);  
 Employer organisations; 
 Employers (GKN, and Hadley Industries);  
 Trade Unions (for example, TGWU);  
 Universities [endnote 4]  
 
An interview with one of the local MPs confirmed that “sectoral partners worked 
together well” and that there was collaborative working among the partners, with 
leadership being taken by the RDA, Advantage West Midlands; “we had the right 
people around the table meeting on a regular basis to sort out any problems that came 
up”.  
However, membership was not completely inclusive. Some of the policy 
implementation agencies such as JobCentre Plus (JCP), the key government 
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employment agency responsible for helping people find jobs, did not sit on the Task 
Force but was on the ‘operational group’, set up to support the work of the Task Force, 
instead. DWP (Department for Work and Pensions) were members of the Joint 
Planning Group, but were not members of the MGR Task Force. HM Revenue and 
Customs also did not appear to formally participate in the Task Force.  
Community engagement is an important aspect of a Task Force. Our research 
revealed that there was community engagement, but that community organisations did 
not sit on the Task Force. However, the Task Force took advice (and acted on that 
advice) from community organisations. The Rover Community Action Trust was 
significant in this respect. A community organisation, which was set up by the 
partners of the Rover workers, were consulted and indeed was vociferous on what 
needed to be done to help those made redundant. Interviews revealed that some 
critical interventions were instituted after issues were raised by this group, such as the 
need to extend and refinance car loans so that ex-workers could remain mobile and 
hence look for work. A Constituency Strategic Partnership, (a local authority 
organisation), and a ‘Community Support Board’, made up of local agencies, were 
later set up to look at neighbourhood impacts and the policy response at the local scale, 
including the longer term regeneration of the Longbridge and Northfield areas, where 
the MG Rover factory was located. 
4.3 Devolved Responsibility?  
In respect of the degree of devolved responsibility, we find that in many ways the MG 
Rover Task Force exemplified a case of devolved responsibility. Although the 
Department of Trade and Industry took the lead in drawing up a contingency plan and 
in setting up the joint planning group in December 2004 to determine the government 
response to a possible closure situation (HOC, 2007), the DTI then handed over 
responsibility for dealing with the policy response to the closure down to the regional 
level. However, whilst the Task Force took decisions, it also referred up to Ministers 
and did not have an executive role as such. The Regional Development Agency AWM 
- in its leadership role - coordinated the ‘multiple agencies… which [were] 
operationally autonomous… and structurally coupled’ and which took action to deal 
with the impacts of the closure (MG RTF 2005, 2006). These included Task Force 
member agencies as well as those on the ‘Executive Steering Group for Operational 
Activity’, such as JobCentre Plus and the Learning and Skills Council (LSC), 
Birmingham City Council, the Government Office and the Chamber of Commerce 
(AWM, 2005). Our Interviews with policy makers and implementation agencies 
indicated that JobCentre Plus worked together with the Learning and Skills Council 
and that the latter liaised with local colleges over training courses.  
The Task Force drew on expertise in the industry including Accelerate, as 
noted above, based at the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce, to determine what 
help firms in the automotive supply chain could be given, as well as from community 
organisations regarding the help that the workforce needed. Drawing on work done 
prior to the closure, the Task Force agreed policy and devised a package of measures. 
There is some evidence of the ‘new centrism’, however, in how central government 
made funding available. Initially some £156m was made available by the (then) 
Department of Trade and Industry. It was later increased to £176m through additional 
contributions of £10 million from Advantage West Midlands and £10 million from 
Birmingham City Council (NAO, 2006). The latter funding was allocated to support 
for the local community, such as debt advice. Support for community resources was 
limited, however; Birmingham City Council had to draw on European Social Funding 
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for local initiatives. Thus there is evidence that the remit of the agency shapes the 
course of action adopted, with each agency having its role in the process, and that 
government puts in place controls over how the expenditure should be used (see Table 
2).  
 
[table 2 goes here] 
 
4.4 Tailored Policy Outcomes? 
In looking at the policy responses, it was clear that a considerable amount of work was 
put in to devising suitable responses to the closure, both prior to the closure and by the 
MGR Task Force. The DTI had commissioned two studies by the consultancy firm 
Regeneris Consulting (2005a, 2005b) to explore the likely impacts of the closure as a 
prelude to determining the policy response. Our study was principally concerned with 
the help given to the workers, but here we can consider what help was given to MGR 
suppliers to adjust to a markedly changed business environment.  
Help for businesses included: the writing of revised strategy and business 
plans; specialist Business Advice Service; help with finding new business and 
developing new products; a training and a wage replacement package; and deferral of 
tax payments (through HM Revenue and Customs) (MG RTF, 2005; NAO, 2006). 
Accelerate offered support to firms in the automotive industry supply chain. AWM 
also set up the Advantage Transition Bridge Fund which offered loans of £50,000 and 
up to a maximum of £500,000 to businesses facing financial difficulty and having a 
viable recovery plan but insufficient finance from normal sources (NAO, 2006). The 
latter has been reactivated during the current recession, with £9 million being made 
available to support firms in the West Midlands, making this an example of how 
experience gained during the MGR Task Force can be reapplied. 
Ex-workers received help with claiming benefits and finding a job and an 
information pack was given out. To meet an undertaking to ministers, JobCentre Plus 
registered at least 5,300 ex MGR workers in 7 days to qualify for benefits. They took 
on 160 extra staff and worked a double shift to do so at the main office near 
Longbridge (NAO, 2006 and interviews with JCP personnel). Redundancy payments 
were made by the Redundancy Payments Directorate of the DTI sooner than usual; 
the Human Resources Division of MGR was kept on until December 2005 to assist 
with this work (NAO, 2006). Pensions were safeguarded through the newly created 
Pension Protection Fund. JobCentre Plus worked with the Learning and Skills Council 
to deliver training opportunities, which included free travel and a training allowance 
to those made redundant. There was also help for partners and spouses of the ex 
workers as well. A skills and training needs analysis was offered to them. This was 
innovative; even more innovative was the relaxation of the so called ‘16 hour rule’ on 
benefits and training, so that ex-workers could attend training courses without losing 
benefits (NAO, 2006: p50).  
Other initiatives included a Jobs Fair, which was held in May 2005 and was 
attended by 140 employers, and a telephone ‘hot line’ which was established for 
people to call to ask for advice and help (NAO, 2006: p46). A special scheme – the 
‘Manufacturing Hub’ – was also set up to enable those who wanted to find jobs in 
manufacturing firms. Companies employing ex -MG Rover workers were given an 
allowance for free retraining for each worker recruited, free retraining for existing 
employees and an induction support allowance of £50 per week. 
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The question is how far this was really tailored to people’s needs? The in 
depth interviews carried out with ex-workers revealed some criticisms of the help 
given, in particular, the insensitivity of case workers. There also was some criticism 
of the lack of availability of training schemes (Ipsos MORI, 2006). However, it must 
be noted that local colleges put on extra courses over the summer for ex-MG Rover 
workers and their spouses. The interviews with ex-workers and policy implementation 
agencies also revealed that there was confusion about what training allowances people 
were eligible for, and the number of courses that they could obtain funding for. 
Interviewees said that training courses led to jobs that they subsequently found they 
did not like or want to do. They wanted to take another training course to enable them 
to apply for a different job. However, funding was not always made available for 
them to do this. People also said they wanted counselling. Job loss is somewhat like 
bereavement; people needed help with adjusting not only to the loss of a job but, as 
our interviews with ex-workers found, with adjusting to a life changing experience 
(Chapain et al, 2008).   
4.5 Legitimacy 
As noted above, task forces are in part set up because it is hoped that  the policy 
outcomes, in satisfying the polity, would give legitimacy to government action, and 
that this would be recognised as such and would thus afford electoral advantage. 
Indeed in the case of MG Rover, it can be argued that the British government wanted 
to be seen to doing something about the impact of the closure by setting up the MGR 
Task Force because of the political sensitivity of the closure both because of its iconic 
status and also because of timing – during the 2005 General Election. At the same 
time there are questions as to whether the government could have done more to avoid 
the closure occurring (Bailey and Kobayashi, 2008). From this point of view is it 
politically important that people recognise what Government is doing and that the 
policy response meets people’s expectations. In discussions over the closure in 2009 
of LDV, the Birmingham van maker, a number of workers were heard to express their 
frustrations, because the government did not step in with a financial rescue package to 
save LDV. Thus recognition of the legitimacy of action taken by government is 
important in relation to crisis management.  
In respect of the reaction to measures undertaken by the MG Rover Task Force, 
we find both significant successes and also some cause for concern. Our survey of ex 
workers shows that three years on from the closure some 90% of the ex-workers had 
found jobs, with 56% visiting the jobs fair, and that 60% had taken up education or 
retraining. However, while many were happy in their new job, pay is on average 
£5600 less per year in real terms than what the workers received at MGR (Bailey, 
Chapain, Mahdon and Fauth, 2008). We also found that few workers viewed the jobs 
fair a useful form of help. Also, while 80% of respondents found free travel and 65% 
a free place on a training course were the most useful forms of help, take up of these 
forms of assistance was low, at 10% and 37%.  Indeed,  despite all the help on offer to 
the ex-workers in finding another job, 70% said they found a new job through their 
own initiative or through personal contacts rather than via formal channels. In 
particular, our survey found that while most ex-workers (75%) felt supported by 
family, friends and existing support networks; very few said they felt adequately 
supported by government (6%) or their local community (10%). This suggests that 
that despite all of its good work, the Task Force failed to gain legitimacy for its 
actions and to communicate to ex-workers the measures that it was undertaking, or to 
effectively manage expectations.    
Bentley, Bailey & de Ruyter final author version for IJATM 
 12 
4.6 Lessons Learned 
Lessons have been learned from the closure of MG Rover. For example, local 
agencies, notably the Learning and Skills Council and Jobcentre Plus, devised a ‘West 
Midlands Regional Redundancy Response Strategy and Implementation Framework’. 
This proposes that: skills brokers should be used to advise on job and training 
opportunities; that the public sector should take the lead management role; and that a 
provider network should be set up. In addition it recommends that employers should be 
offered services prior to the closure to help workers and that those being made redundant 
should be offered practical help and guidance. The strategy suggests that it should be 
based on partnership working and that the public and private sector should work together 
to develop high quality interventions in establishing a provider network to work 
responsively.  
The findings of our research suggest that there is a need to let people know 
and understand better what help is available. Information was in fact available to 
those being made redundant. Information packs were given to those registering at the 
Job Centre. However it needs to be remembered that workers losing their jobs, 
especially on the scale and in the circumstances of the MG Rover closure, were in 
shock. They needed help in understanding the information. There is also a need to 
offer counselling to help people cope with redundancy, especially those experiencing 
depression and ill health as a result. While there was a speedy response to the crisis, 
interviews with ex-workers suggested that there is a need to be more sensitive to 
people who have never been unemployed and do not know how to make claims for 
benefit or search for a job. Additionally, better advice was needed on the entitlement 
to training courses, since there was confusion over this. There is also a need to inform 
people of the changed nature of the job market and the types of job that are likely to 
be available. In short, there is a need to manage expectations.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Since assuming power in 1997, the Labour government has used a number of task forces 
to deal with a variety of economic development issues. Their emergence can be 
explained by reference to the state modernisation thesis which points to the 
reorganisation of state structures at the central, regional and local level. Alongside this, 
there is the establishment of other less formal political institutions – including task 
forces – signifying a shift to governance, which include interest groups 
(‘stakeholders’) in the policy making process and ‘joined up working’ simply because 
issues are far too complex to be tackled by a single agency and because there is a 
search for legitimacy for government action.  
Our research findings suggest that the MG Rover Task was largely successful in 
displaying effective governance. There was clear evidence of multi-agency and multi-
level working. However, it was not necessarily inclusive, in that community groups were 
not part of the Task Force. However, it drew on their expertise and took advice from 
them. Responsibility was devolved to the Task Force, leadership being taken by the 
RDA, and various agencies were pulled in to deal with the impact of the closure, 
Deliberations in the Task Force saw innovative policy solutions being tailored to help 
both firms in the supply chain and those made redundant (MG RTF 2005, 2006). 
However, we suggest that the Task Force failed in one important respect, in terms of 
gaining legitimacy for its role. Despite the wide range of help available, take up was 
variable. More significantly, few ex-workers felt adequately supported by government. 
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There was also some criticism of policy actions. From this point of view, the Task Force 
perhaps failed to gain legitimacy for its role and the recognition for the real work that it 
actually undertook.  
This suggests that the transformative nature of partnership working embodied in 
the task force approach needs to be remembered. Task forces provide a mechanism for 
bringing agencies and groups together to synergise and produce innovative policy 
solutions. In future, it would be appropriate for task forces to look at ways of tackling the 
issue of making people aware of what is being done and for the messages to be 
transmitted.  
A number of lessons learned have been picked up by the West Midlands 
Regional Task Force which has been newly set up and is looking at ways of mitigating 
the impacts of the current recession. In this sense there is an attempt to address the need 
for proactive and ‘intelligent reactive’ policies to become a ‘permanent capacity’ in 
order for policymakers to address large-scale redundancies as Bailey, Chapain, 
Mahdon and Fauth (2008) argue for (see also the House of Commons, 2009). 
Moreover, the Learning and Skills Council formulated a ‘Regional Redundancy 
Response Strategy and Implementation Framework’. The LDV Task Force has been set 
up to deal with the latest large scale closure in the West Midlands, and the Advantage 
Transition Bridge Fund has been reactivated during the current recession, with £9 
million being available to firms in the region.  
We have also noted that the whilst task force may be a peculiarly British 
approach to dealing with redundancy situations,  it would be useful for further and 
comparative research to explore any differences and similarities in their mode of 
operation, and more generally in terms of policy responses to plant closures. It also 
remains to be seen whether politically the actions being taken in the West Midlands in 
the UK meet people’s expectations and whether they achieve successful crisis 
management.   
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Notes 
 
1. The research project, The Economic and Social Impact of the Demise of Rover at 
Longbridge: A Longitudinal and Holistic Approach to Economic Restructuring, 
funded by ESRC (award number RES-000-22-2478), looked at the impact of the 
closure of MG Rover on workers and the neighbourhood three years on as well as 
the policy response. It involved a survey of former workers.  
 
2. These included UK government departments, namely, DTI (Department of Trade 
and Industry), now called BIS, (Department of Business, Innovation and Skills) 
and prior to this, BERR (Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform) and also DETR, (Department of Environment, Transport and the 
Regions) now called DCLG – the Department of Communities and Local 
Government. 
 
3. Accelerate was responsible for a set of schemes of assistance for firms in the 
automotive industry supply chain. See Accelerate. http://www.accelerate.uk.net/ 
 
4. In more detail these were, at national level (the DTI’s Automotive Unit and 
Members of Parliament for several local constituencies); the regional level 
(GOWM, AWM (the Regional Development Agency), and the West Midlands 
Regional Assembly); the local level (West Midlands Local Government 
Association, Birmingham City Council, Worcestershire County Council, Sandwell 
Council, the Black Country Consortium, and Birmingham Forward); the Skills 
Agencies (the Regional Skills Partnership and Birmingham and Solihull Learning 
and Skills Council); employer organisations (the SMMT (Society of Motor 
Manufacturers and Traders), Industry Forum, the CBI (Confederation of British 
Industry), EEF (Engineering Employers Federation), the Chamber of Commerce, 
and the Federation of Small Businesses); employers(GKN, and Hadley 
Industries); the Trade Unions (TGWU (Transport and General Workers), 
AMICUS (created by merger of the Manufacturing, Science and Finance (MSF) 
union and the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU)), the TUC 
(Trades Union Congress); and local Universities (Aston University, the Warwick 
Manufacturing Group and the West Midlands Higher Education Association). 
. 
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Table 1: Task Force Aims by Type  
 
Employer based Sectoral Area based 
 Redeploy and/or retrain 
redundant workforce 
 Secure sale of facility 
and/or site 
 Assess community and 
supply chain impact 
 
 
 
 Analyse sectoral/regional 
situation 
 Recommendations to 
improve competitiveness 
and retain employment 
 Assist redundant workforce 
 Focus attention on target area 
problems and opportunities 
 Develop action programmes 
and initiatives 
 Monitor and review progress 
 Improve co-ordination and 
integration between agencies 
 
Source: Pike (2002) 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Regional Support Package 
 
Nature of support £million 
1. For former employees    
    Statutory Redundancy payments and compensation awards  40 
    Training for workers made redundant at MG Rover and suppliers  50 
2. Support to MG Rover suppliers and retailers     
     Grant support to former MG Rover suppliers 42 
Loan support for suppliers and retailers struggling to finance a viable  
recovery plan  
25 
Investment in technology and innovation infrastructure in the three West 
Midlands High Tech corridors  
9 
3. Support for the community (Funded by Birmingham City Council)    
Measures to address community impact 10 
Total 176 
Source: HOC (2007) 
 
 
